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Abstract. We address the problem of optimal Central Bank intervention in the exchange rate
market when interventions create feedback in the rate dynamics. In particular, we extend the work
done on optimal impulse control by Cadenillas and Zapatero [2; 3] to incorporate temporary market
reactions, of random duration and level, to Bank interventions, and to establish results for more
general rate processes. We obtain new explicit optimal impulse control strategies that account for
these market reactions, and show that they cannot be obtained simply by adjusting the intervention
cost in a model without market reactions.
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1. Introduction. In countries dependent on foreign trade and foreign capital,
the Central Bank is normally in charge of exchange rate policy. This usually means
that the Central Bank has the ability to intervene in the markets in order to keep
their currency rates within a band, or close to a target rate set by the Bank’s policy
makers.
Intervention can take two different (compatible) forms: adjustment of domestic
interest rate levels, which influences the attractiveness of foreign investments; and
direct purchases or sales of foreign currency reserves in the foreign exchange market.
The first form of intervention can be modeled as a continuous (classical) control
problem, and the second as an impulse control problem. In this paper we focus only
on the second type of intervention, interpreting a market intervention as a way to
change the exchange rate by a desired amount via sales or purchases of reserves over
a time short enough to be reasonably modeled as an instantaneous impulse.
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The problem is to find an optimal intervention strategy keeping the exchange
rate near a target level, set by the bank, while minimizing cost of intervention. Since
the exchange rate will always drift away from the target rate between interventions,
one approach to control intervention costs has been to set a “target zone” or band,
and act to keep the exchange rate within this band. Various papers in the economics
literature have considered this problem, e.g. Krugman [9], Froot and Obstfeld [5],
and Flood and Garber [4].
The first person to apply the theory of stochastic impulse control to this problem
was Jeanblanc-Picque [6], later extended by Korn [7]. Both considered an exogenously
specified target band within which the exchange rate is to be contained, and found the
optimal sizes of interventions required when the exchange rate reaches the boundary
of the target band.
An important insight was obtained by Mundaca and Oksendal [10] and Cadenil-
las and Zapatero [2; 3], who realized that it is not necessary to exogenously set a
target band. Rather, the correct target band can be derived endogenously as part
of the solution to the optimization problem, using a cost function combining cost of
intervention with a running cost given by an increasing function of the distance be-
tween the target rate and the current rate. Mundaca and Oksendal used a standard
brownian motion model for the underlying exchange rate; Cadenillas and Zapatero
used a geometric brownian motion and explicitly computed, for certain examples, the
optimal intervention levels and intervention amounts.
They expressly assume, however, that investors do not observe or anticipate the
interventions of the Bank, so that the process driving the rate dynamics is not af-
fected by interventions. This is unrealistic, but to do otherwise “would yield different
dynamics for the exchange rate and would probably make the model intractable” [3].
In this paper we overcome this intractability to solve the problem with the same
level of explicitness as do Cadenillas and Zapatero, but for more general exchange rate
processes, and – most importantly – allowing for a market reaction to interventions.
We assume that the rate dynamics changes to a different process for a random period
of time T after each intervention (where T is assumed independent of the rate process),
after which it reverts to the pre-intervention process. For example, we could imagine
that the volatility of the exchange rate might move to a new, higher level for a period
of time after an intervention, to reflect heightened market uncertainty about the path
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of rates in the near term. The new rate process need not be known in advance: it can
be drawn at random each time an intervention takes place, as long as the draw is iid
and also independent of the rate process.
We still must retain the assumption that investors do not anticipate interventions
by the Bank. This is much milder than the assumption that investors do not react
to interventions. Indeed, we might expect that the Bank itself will be revising the
parameters used in it’s exchange rate model as time passes, so that the optimal
solution today would not persist due to the incorporation of new information in the
Bank’s model. If this happens, investors are unlikely to have much confidence in
forecasts of the next Bank intervention. Hence it is not necessary to assume that
interventions are invisible to the market in order to reasonably ignore the market
effect of investor prediction of future intervention times.
We solve our problem by applying the theory of stochastic impulse control (see
Korn [8] for a good overview) and, as we are able to obtain analytical results, we can
compare the policies with and without a reaction period. In the spirit of Cadenillas
and Zapatero, and since we can provide numerical solutions, we also include compar-
ative statics analysis about the effects of the changes of parameters on the optimal
intervention strategy.
We consider a currency with exchange rate dynamics modeled by a general Itoˆ
diffusion, such as a geometric Brownian Motion, which temporarily changes, at ran-
dom, to a different Itoˆ diffusion during a “reaction period” that lasts for a finite
random time T after each intervention by the Central Bank. The Bank tries to keep
this exchange rate close to a given target, and there is a running cost associated to
the difference between the exchange rate and the target. However, there are also
fixed and, optionally, proportional costs associated with each intervention. The Bank
determines when and by how much to move the rate, but cannot control the duration
of the reaction period or the rate process during the reaction period, neither of which
are assumed known by the Bank in advance. The objective of this paper is to find
the optimal level of intervention, as well as the optimal sizes of the interventions, so
as to minimize the total cost.
Our analysis currently requires us to impose the restriction that the Bank is not
allowed to intervene during the temporary reaction period. However, this restriction
is reasonable from the perspective of Central Bank policy. The reaction periods are
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intended to model short market re-adjustment periods, so the restriction is short-
lived. Also, after they have reset the rate to a desired target, Central Banks will want
to wait for a time to observe the medium-term effects of their action. If they think
the market is still in a temporary reaction mode with uncertain parameters, but will
soon revert to the previous dynamic (volatility, drift), it is reasonable for them to
preserve their capital and wait for the re-establishment of the long term dynamical
rate parameters before contemplating another intervention.
We shall prove that when the exchange rate lies in a specific interval - the con-
tinuation region - the Central Bank’s optimal policy is not to intervene. However,
when the exchange rate reaches the boundary of that interval – when it enters the
intervention region– then the Central Bank must intervene (as soon as the reaction
time has expired), pushing the exchange rate to yet another interval, the preferred
region inside the continuation region. (In case there are no proportional intervention
costs, the preferred interval degenerates to a single point.)
We illustrate an example in which a temporary reaction period of increased volatil-
ity leads to an optimal policy in which the intervention band is widened, calling for
great patience by the Central Bank, and less frequent but larger interventions. We
show with an example that the optimal policy cannot be calculated simply by in-
creasing the intervention cost – an increased cost can match the wider no-intervention
band, but will not reproduce the correct optimal restarting value. Therefore, correct
intervention policy requires the modeling of market reactions to intervention.
Korn [7] also studies the case where interventions have random consequences, but
in his model it is the amount by which the rate is changed that is random, whereas
here we assume the Bank can control the initial rate change level, but cannot predict
the new volatility or drift, or the duration of the reaction period.
The structure of the paper is as follows: in section 2 we formulate the problem by
introducing the exchange rate dynamics and the Central Bank objective; in section 3
we state the quasi-variational inequalities for this problem and state sufficient condi-
tions of optimality for this impulse control problem; in section 4 we solve the problem
of Central Bank intervention, with and without recovery period, and we perform some
comparative statics analysis. In section 5 we present the proof of the main theorem,
and we close the paper with some conclusions.
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2. Problem Statement. We denote by Xy(t) the exchange rate process in the
absence of interventions, representing domestic currency units per unit of foreign
currency at time t, with initial value Xy(0−) = y. We suppose that Xy follows the
diffusion process given by the time-homogeneous stochastic differential equation
dXy(t) = µ1(Xy(t))dt+ σ1(Xy(t))dWt, (2.1)
where Wt is a one-dimensional Brownian motion in a probability space (Ω,F , P )
with augmented natural filtration {Ft}, and µ1, σ1 are Lipschitz functions on R. (If
µ1(x) > 0 the currency experiences a devaluatory pressure and if µ1(x) < 0 a pressure
to appreciate.) For technical reasons mentioned below we suppose that the process
Xy is defined on a time interval (−a,∞), for a > 0. The interval [0,∞) will be the
domain of permitted intervention times.
Suppose now that interventions take place at times τi, i ∈ N = {1, 2, 3, . . . }, such
that
0 ≤ τ1 < τ2 < τ3 < · · · ,
each such intervention causing a discontinuous change in the exchange rate, where the
intervention times and discontinuity sizes are under the control of the Central Bank.
Moreover, for each i ∈ N we suppose that immediately after the ith intervention
there is a bounded, random length of time Ti, 0 ≤ Ti ≤ T¯ , during which the exchange
rate follows a new drift µi2 and volatility σ
i
2 (also Lipschitz), after which the drift and
volatility revert to the original values. Here T¯ is some positive uniform upper bound
on the reaction times.
The new drift and volatility are also permitted to be random; their distributions
can be specified quite freely, as long as the sequences σi2, µ
i
2 and Ti, are iid and
independent of each other and of the rate process driver Wt. For definiteness, we can
specify the new drift and volatility rates as
µi2(x) = µ
0
2(x) + µ
i
δx and σ2(x)
i = σ02(x) + σ
i
δx, (2.2)
where µ02 and σ
0
2 are fixed, known functions, and µ
i
δ and σ
i
δ ≥ 0 are iid with some
known bounded probability distributions. The case µiδ = 0 = σ
i
δ for all i corresponds
to a market reaction process known in advance; the case T i = 0 for all i corresponds
to no market reaction, so we will henceforth assume E[Ti] > 0.
5
We denote by X˜iy(t) the diffusion process followed during this reaction period of
duration Ti after the ith intervention:
dX˜iy(t) = µ
i
2(X˜
i
y(t)) dt+ σ
i
2(X˜
i
y(t)) dWt
where y is the value of the rate process immediately after intervention.
We impose the important restriction that new interventions are not allowed during
this reaction period. Interventions are also restricted to times τ ≥ 0, but the case
τ = 0 is allowed. Our convention will be that the controlled process is right continuous
with left limits (cadlag), but to make sense of the left limit at zero, we need the
process defined in some neighborhood of zero, so our time domain is (−a,∞), a > 0,
as mentioned above.
Given the uncontrolled process Xy, we now define an impulse control ν and it’s
corresponding cadlag controlled process Xνy as follows:
Definition 2.1. An impulse control (strategy) ν = (τ1, τ2, ...; ξ1, ξ2, ....) corre-
sponding to the controlled process Xνy is a sequence of intervention times τi and control
actions ξi, corresponding to a cadlag process Xνy (t) defined for t ∈ (−a,∞), such that
• 0 ≤ τi ≤ τi+1 a.s. for all i ∈ N , and τi < τi+1 a.s. if τi <∞
• τi is a stopping time with respect to the filtration Fνt = σ{Xνy (s−), s ≤ t},
• ξi : Ω → R is Fτi-measurable (Intuitively, τi indicates the time of the ith
intervention of size ξi.)
• Xνy (0−) = y
• dXνy (t) = dXy(t), t < τ1, and for all j ∈ N :
• Xνy (τj) = Xνy (τj−)− ξj
• dXνy (t) = dX˜iXνy (τj)(t), τj ≤ t < τj + Tj
• dXνy (t) = dXXνy (τj+T )(t), τj + Tj ≤ t < τj+1
We allow the sequence of intervention times to be of finite length k by setting
τi = ∞ for i > k. Also, it’s possible that τj+1 = τj + Tj , in which case the interval
τj + Tj ≤ t < τj+1 mentioned in the last item of the definition is empty.
We consider the performance function
Jν(x) = E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtf(Xνx (t))dt+
∞∑
i=1
e−rτiK (Xνx (τj−), ξj)
]
where K(x, ξ) is a given function that represents the cost of intervention depending
on the state x at intervention and the intervention size ξ. (In examples we often
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take K(x, ξ) to be either a constant K or a constant plus proportional costs K1 +
K2|ξ|.) The constant r represents the discount factor, assumed fixed here, and f is a
continuous running cost function, for example measuring the deviation from a target
value.
The Central Bank wants to use a policy that minimizes the performance function
over all possible admissible controls. Therefore, we define the Value Function as
V (x) = inf
v∈V
Jν(x)
where V is the set of admissible controls. This value function depends on the precise
definition of admissible – in application it is enough that V includes all reasonable
controls that might be considered in practice. For our purposes we define V as follows.
Definition 2.2. An impulse control
ν = (τ1, τ2, ...; ξ1, ξ2, ....) ,
is admissible (ν ∈ V) if
Xνx (τi) > 0 for all i ∈ N , (2.3)
τi+1 − τi ≥ Ti for all i ∈ N , (2.4)
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtf(Xνx (t)) dt
]
<∞, (2.5)
and
E
[∫ ∞
0
(e−rtXνx (t))
2 dt
]
<∞. (2.6)
Condition (2.4) means that the central bank will not intervene while the market
is still reacting to the previous intervention. This implies that τn → ∞ as n → ∞
almost surely: since the Ti have positive mean, the law of large numbers applies and
τn ≥
∑n−1
i=1 Ti →∞. Conditions (2.5) and (2.6) are mild boundedness conditions that
will be easily satisfied by any practical intervention policy and running cost function.
Additionally, let’s define K˜ as the expected running cost immediately after an
intervention takes place provided that the process restarts from x¯ and that it remains
under the second diffusion regime for a period of time T
K˜(x¯) = E
[∫ T
0
e−rtf(X˜x¯(t))dt
]
.
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(Since the sequences (Ti), (µiδ), and (σ
i
δ) are iid and independent of X˜, K˜ does not
depend on which intervention has occurred. We write T for a generic random variable
with the same distribution as Ti, and similarly for µδ, σδ, and X˜.)
3. Quasi-variational Inequalities. To solve the impulse control problem for-
mulated above, We will use the quasi-variational inequalities (QVI) approach (Ben-
soussan and Lions [1], Korn [8]), which involves constructing the value function V (x)
as a solution to a system of inequalities described below. The value function V (x)
then determines the optimal control strategy, called the QVI-control associated to
V . Once we have proved that solutions of the QVI yield the optimal intervention
strategy, this reduces the control problem to the much easier problem of solving the
QVI. We state the general results here and illustrate their use in the next section.
First, we require a new optimal intervention operatorM adapted to our situation.
Let R+ = {x ∈ R : x > 0}.
Definition 3.1. For a function φ : R+ → R, and x ∈ R+, ξ ∈ R, define operators
M and M as follows:
M(φ, x, ξ) = K(x, ξ) + K˜(x− ξ) + E
[
e−rTφ(X˜x−ξ(T ))
]
(3.1)
and
Mφ(x) = inf
ξ
{M(φ, x, ξ) : x− ξ > 0}. (3.2)
whenever these are well-defined.
We also need the differential operator L given by
Lφ = 1
2
σ21(x)
d2
dx2
φ+ µ1(x)
d
dx
φ− rφ. (3.3)
This operator will be useful in two ways. First, Ito’s formula applied to any
function of the form e−rtφ(Xx(t)), where X is the uncontrolled process (2.1), gives,
for any two times S < U ,
e−rtφ(Xx(t))|US =
∫ U
S
e−rtLφ(Xx(t)) dt (3.4)
+
∫ U
S
e−rtσ1(Xx(t))φ′(Xx(t)) dWt. (3.5)
Second, when there are no interventions, V takes the form
V (x) = E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtf(Xx(t))dt
]
(3.6)
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which, if f is bounded and continuous (e.g. Oksendal [11, Ch. 8]), satisfies the equation
LV (x) + f(x) = 0. (3.7)
We will see that the solution of our impulse control problem splits the domain of x
in two regions, an intervention and a continuation region. In the intervention region,
where it is optimal to intervene, it should be the case that V (x) = MV (x). On the
other hand, the interval where intervention is not optimal becauseMV (x) > V (x), is
referred to as the continuation region, and we have LV (x) + f(x) = 0 in that region.
This suggests that the Value function should satisfy a set of inequalities, which are
commonly known as the Quasi-Variational Inequalities.
Definition 3.2. We say that the function φ satisfies the quasi-variational
inequalities (QVI) if φ satisfies the following three conditions:
Lφ(x) + f(x) ≥ 0, (3.8)
φ(x) ≤Mφ(x), (3.9)
(Lφ(x) + f(x))(φ(x)−Mφ(x)) = 0. (3.10)
From a solution of the quasi-variational inequalities, we construct the following
control:
Definition 3.3. Let φ be a continuous solution of the QVI. Then the following
impulse control is called a QVI-control associated to φ (if it exists):
τ1 := inf{t > 0 : φ(Xx(t−)) =Mφ(Xx(t−))}, and for every n > 1,
τn := inf{t > τn−1 + Tn−1 : φ(Xνx (t−)) =Mφ(Xνx (t−))} and
ξn := arg min
{
K(Xνx (τn−), ξ) + K˜(Xνx (τn−)− ξ) + E
[
e−rTφ(X˜Xνx (τn−)−ξ(T )|Fτn−
]
: ξ ∈ R, Xνx (τn−)− ξ > 0
}
.
The arg min above might not be unique, so we do not claim there is only one QVI-
control – though in practice we do observe uniqueness.
The following main theorem permits us to verify that a solution of the QVI and
the admissible control attached to it solve the impulse control problem. Denote by
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L2 the operator defined by
L2φ(x) = 12σ
2
2(x)
d2
dx2
φ(x) + µ2(x)
d
dx
φ(x)− rφ(x). (3.11)
Theorem 3.4. Let φ ∈ C1(R+) be a solution of the QVI and suppose there is a
finite subset N ⊂ R+ such that φ ∈ C2(R+ −N ). If φ satisfies the growth conditions
E
∫ ∞
0
(e−rtσi(Xνx (t))φ
′(Xνx (t)))
2 dt <∞, i = 1, 2, (3.12)
lim
t→∞E
[
e−rtφ(Xνx (t))
]
= 0, (3.13)
and
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt|L2φ(Xνx (t))| dt
]
<∞, (3.14)
for every process Xνx (t) corresponding to an admissible impulse control ν, then for
every x ∈ R+
V (x) ≥ φ(x).
Moreover, if the QVI-control corresponding to φ is admissible then it is an optimal
impulse control, and for every x ∈ R+
V (x) = φ(x). (3.15)
The theorem is proved in Section 5.
4. Solving the QVI: An Illustration. We now illustrate how theorem 3.4 is
used in the context of finding the Central Bank’s optimal impulse control strategy.
Our results can be applied to quite general exchange rate processes, but for simplicity
we illustrate their use for the common case of geometric brownian motion. We can
also handle quite general cost functions K(x, ξ); to simplify our examples we now
restrict attention to the special case of fixed costs K(x, ξ) = K.
As a warm-up, we first describe the known case T = 0 when there is no market
reaction period.
4.1. The case without market reaction. A Central Bank desires to keep the
exchange rate close to a target ρ using an impulse control strategy. The admissible
10
controls are the same as above, except that since T = 0 here we need to replace
condition (2.4) with the admissibility condition
P
(
lim
i→∞
τi ≤ t
)
= 0 ∀ t ≥ 0. (4.1)
Let Xt represent domestic currency units per unit of foreign currency at time t
and suppose that the dynamics of Xt are given by
Xνx (t) = x+
∫ t
0
µXνx (s) ds+
∫ t
0
σXνx (s) dWs +
∞∑
i=1
1{τi<t}ξi,
where ν = (τi, ξi)∞i=1 is an admissible impulse control. This means that X
ν
x (t) follows
a geometric Brownian motion in the absence of interventions.
The Central Bank wants to find the optimal impulse control that minimizes the
following functional that depends on the control ν
Jν(x) = E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtf(Xνx (t)) dt+
∑
i
e−rτig(ξi)1{τi<∞}
]
,
where
f(x) = (x− ρ)2,
and for ease of exposition in this illustration we take g(ξi) = K, for some positive
constant K, meaning that there are only fixed intervention costs. The Value Function
for this example is
V (x) = inf
ν
Jν(x)
where the infimum is taken over all admissible controls.
Cadenillas and Zapatero [2] show that the optimal control consists in forcing an
intervention each time the exchange rate process hits the boundary of a band [a, b],
and the optimal intervention consists in jumping to a value α, where a < α < b.
(When there are proportional intervention costs as well, they show that the strategy
is to jump to the boundary of a band properly contained in [a, b]; we observe similar
results when T > 0.)
They show that the Value Function is
V (x) =

φ(α) +K if x < a
φ(x) = Axγ1 +Bxγ2 +
(
1
r−σ2−2µ
)
x2 − 2ρr−µx+ ρ
2
r if a ≤ x ≤ b
φ(α) +K if x > b
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where γ1,2 =
−µ+0.5σ2±
√
(µ−0.5σ2)2+2rσ2
σ2 . The unknown parameters A,B, a, α, b are
found using continuity, optimality, and smooth pasting conditions (as we will explain
in the next subsection). Note that V solves LV (x) + f(x) = 0 in the continuation
region, a < x < b. In the intervention region, as there are no intervention costs, we
have that MV (x) = V (α) +K.
4.2. The case with market reaction. We assume for this example that we
have the same intervention and running costs as above, but now after the ith inter-
vention the volatility parameter changes to σi2 = σ+σ
i
δ for a time Ti > 0, representing
a temporary new market regime in reaction to the intervention. During this reaction
time additional intervention is not allowed.
Our method for finding the optimal impulse control strategy is to propose the form
of the optimal control ν (up to some unknown parameters), and use ν to construct
a solution φ to the QVI for which ν is the QVI-control. If, for the proper choice of
parameters, φ and ν satisfy the smoothness and growth conditions of theorem 3.4,
and if ν is admissible, we will be able to conclude by theorem 3.4 that φ is the value
function for the problem and ν is our desired optimal strategy.
The proposal is that we should intervene each time the exchange rate process
leaves an interval (a, b), as soon as at least time T has elapsed since the last inter-
vention, and that the optimal intervention consists in shifting the exchange rate to α,
where a < α < b. The constants a, b, and α are as yet unknown.
If indeed it is optimal to intervene only outside the interval (a, b), then we will
expect φ to satisfy the differential equation Lφ(x) + f(x) = 0 inside the interval.
(The interval (a, b) is called the “continuation region” because the exchange rate
freely follows the original SDE in this interval, after any reaction period.)
Therefore, solving Lφ(x) + f(x) = 0 we obtain, for a < x < b,
φ(x) = Axγ1 +Bxγ2 +
(
1
r − σ2 − 2µ
)
x2 − 2ρ
r − µx+
ρ2
r
where γ1,2 =
−µ+0.5σ2±
√
(µ−0.5σ2)+2rσ2
σ2 , and A and B are yet to be found.
We need to compute the running cost K˜ incurred during the reaction period T :
K˜(x) = E
[∫ T
0
e−rt(X˜x(t)− ρ)2 dt
]
.
For fixed T and σ2, the above integral can be computed analytically because X˜x(t)
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follows a Geometric Brownian Motion. Since T and σ2 are independent of Wt, these
variables can be integrated separately:
K˜(x) = E
[∫ T
0
e−rt(x2e2(µt−
1
2σ
2
2t+σ2Wt) − 2e−rt(e(µt− 12σ22t+σ2Wt)ρx+ ρ2) dt
]
= E
[∫ T
0
e−rt
(
x2e2µ t+σ
2
2 t − 2 ρ xeµ t + ρ2
)
dt
]
where we have used E[eσ2Wt ] = e
1
2σ
2
2t.
The boundary conditions at the intervention points a, b can be found using con-
tinuity and the condition φ = Mφ, with the operator M defined by equation (3.2),
and α denoting a minimizer in the definition of M:
α = arg min
(
K + K˜(α) + E[e−rTφ(X˜α(T ))]
)
.
We obtain
φ(a) = φ(b) = K + K˜(α) + E
[
e−rTφ(X˜α(T ))
]
(4.2)
where the expectation E
[
e−rTφ(X˜α(T ))
]
can be computed by separating the inde-
pendent variables as
E
[
e−rT
{∫ b
a
φ(x)p(x;α, T, σ2) dx+ φ(a)
∫
[a,b]c
p(x;α, T, σ2) dx
}]
,
where [a, b]c denotes the complement of [a, b], and p(x;α, T, σ2) is the probability
density of the Log-Normal distribution of X˜α(T ):
log(X˜α(T )) ∼ N(lnα+ µT − 12σ
2
2T, σ
2
2T ),
and the expectation E is now over T and σ2.
In addition we have the “smooth pasting requirement” (the C1 condition), needed
for the application of theorem 3.4
φ′(a) = 0, (4.3)
φ′(b) = 0, (4.4)
and the optimality of α, which implies solving
d
dα
(
K˜(α) + E
[
e−rT
∫ +∞
−∞
p(x;α, T, σ2)φ(x) dx
])
= 0, (4.5)
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where the expectation here is over the distribution of T and σ2.
The above equations can be solved to obtain the parameters A,B, a, b and α, and
the Value function has the same structure as in the case without market reaction, but
with these different parameters:
V (x) =

K + K˜(α) + E[e−rTφ(X˜α(T ))] if x < a
φ(x) = Axγ1 +Bxγ2 +
(
1
r−σ2−2µ
)
x2 − 2ρr−µx+ ρ
2
r if a ≤ x ≤ b
K + K˜(α) + E[e−rTφ(X˜α(T ))] if x > b
Note that by construction this function is continuous at a and b, and we denote
the common value by
Θ := φ(a) = φ(b) = K + K˜(α) + E[e−rTφ(X˜α(T ))].
Finally, to complete the solution, we must verify the hypotheses of theorem 3.4
to conclude that this is indeed the Value Function, and that the proposed policy is
optimal:
Theorem 4.1. Let A,B, a, b, α be a solution of the system of equations (4.2)
- (4.5) with a < α < b, and let Θ be the constant defined above. Consider the C1
function V (x) : (0,∞)→ [0,∞) defined by
V (x) = φ(x) = Axγ1 +Bxγ2 +
(
1
r − σ2 − 2µ
)
x2 − 2ρ
r − µx+
ρ2
r
(4.6)
for a < x < b, and V (x) = Θ otherwise.
If
a < ρ− (rΘ)1/2 and b > ρ+ (rΘ)1/2, (4.7)
and
V (α) < Θ, (4.8)
then V (x) is the Value Function; namely,
V (x) = inf
ν
Jν(x)
and the optimal policy is the QVI-control corresponding to V , given by
τ1 = inf{t > 0 : X(t) /∈ (a, b)},
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τi = inf{t >= τi−1 + Ti−1 : Xν(t) /∈ (a, b)} (i > 1)
and
Xν(τi) = Xν(τi−)− ξi = α.
Proof. We start by showing that V satisfies the QVI:
First QVI Inequality: From the definition of V ,
LV (x) + f(x) = −rΘ + (x− ρ)2
when x < a or x > b, and
LV (x) + f(x) = Lφ(x) + (x− ρ)2
when a ≤ x ≤ b.
By construction of φ, Lφ(x)+(x−ρ)2 = 0 in the interval [a, b]; outside the interval
we have that Lφ(x) + (x− ρ)2 > 0 because of conditions (4.7).
Second QVI Inequality: From the definitions of M and α, we have MV (x) = K +
K˜(α)+E[e−rTV (α)] = Θ for all x. Therefore,MV (x) = V (x) for x /∈ [a, b]. We need
to show that V (x) ≤ Θ for all x ∈ (a, b), from which we can concludeMV (x) ≤ V (x).
To see this, notice that on the interval (a, b), the third derivative V ′′′ is of the
form c1xd1 + c2xd2 , which can have at most one zero on R+. Therefore the second
derivative V ′′ can change sign at most twice in (a, b). Because V (a) = V (b) = Θ and
V ′(a) = V ′(b) = 0, this means V (x)−Θ cannot take both signs on [a, b] – this would
imply at least three sign changes for the second derivative – so we must either have
V (x) ≤ Θ or V (x) ≥ Θ for all x. Because of (4.8), it must be the former.
Third QVI Inequality: Holds as a result of the above arguments.
To verify the remaining conditions of theorem 3.4, first note that V ′(x) is bounded,
so condition (3.12) holds via the admissibility condition (2.6). Condition (3.13) is
immediately satisfied because V is bounded. Condition (3.14) is satisfied because V ′′
is bounded, even though discontinuous at a and b.
Finally, the QVI control given above is admissible: condition (2.3) holds since X
is lognormal and α > 0; condition (2.4) holds by construction; and conditions (2.5)
and (2.6) hold because X and X˜ are lognormal and Xν is bounded inside [a, b] except
for possible excursions for a duration at most T¯ .
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4.3. Numerical Example:. Consider ρ = 1.4, r = 0.06, µ = 0.1, σ = 0.3, a
fixed σ2 = 0.4, K = 0.5, and a fixed recovery time T = 1.
A searching algorithm was implemented to obtain the parameters A,B, a, b and
α that solve the system of equations (4.2) - (4.5). The key element that allows solving
the expectation E
[
e−rTφ(X˜α(T ))
]
in equations (4.2) and (4.5) is realizing that φ(x)
is constant outside (a, b). For fixed T , the expectation can then be expressed as:
e−rT
{∫ b
a
φ(x)p(x;α, T, σ2) dx+ φ(a)
∫ a
−∞
p(x;α, T, σ2) dx
+φ(b)
∫ ∞
b
p(x;α, T, σ2) dx
}
.
These integrals can be computed for a given trial set of parameters A,B, a, b and α.
(The evaluation of the expectation for the case of fixed and proportional transactions
costs is also possible with some modifications.)
Table I and figure 6.1 compare the policy results with and without the reaction
period. The coefficients A and B are found to be −1.330 and −93.064 when T = 0
and −1.193 and −92.759 when T = 1. (Conditions (4.7) are easily verified.)
The existence of a new regime after interventions requires a modification in the
policy observed by the Central Bank: the intervention points are different, notice that
the band is widened; in addition, the amount of intervention is also different, as the
new restarting value α indicates. The presence of a market reaction leads to the need
for greater patience by the Central Bank, less frequent but larger interventions, and
greater optimal costs.
We also observe that the effect of a reaction period in the model, even with
a deterministic reaction time and amount as in this numerical example, cannot be
captured simply by adjusting the cost function instead. In this example, by changing
K from 0.5 to 0.63, and keeping reaction time T = 0, we can match the intervention
points a and b obtained when T = 1, but the optimal restarting value is different:
α = 1.230 instead of 1.212; see table I. The introduction of a market reaction in the
model leads to a different policy than would arise by simply adjusting the intervention
cost upward to compensate for the increased uncertainty.
4.4. Comparative Statics Analysis. One of the main advantages of obtaining
analytical solutions is that comparative analysis can be performed. If a Central Bank
knows what type of reaction to expect from the market after performing interventions
16
– namely, an increase (decrease) in volatility, or an increase (decrease) in the trend
on the dynamics of its currency – then the optimal policy can be found.
In table II we present the optimal policy in four different scenarios. Both the
bands and the intervention sizes depend on the nature of the reaction of the market
during the reaction time after interventions. It is reasonable to suppose volatility
increases after interventions and, as we showed above, this implies a wider band than
in the case without market reaction. For comparison purposes we also computed
the case when the volatility decreases during the reaction period; in this case the
band shrinks. It could also be the case that the trend of the currency is modified
as a temporary outcome of the intervention; perhaps reflecting the sentiment of the
market with respect to the confidence on the Central Bank’s actions. It is interesting
to observe that the band widens if the drift trend increases or decreases and, as
expected, the optimal restarting point is closer to the long term target ρ = 1.4 when
the drift is lowered during the reaction period.
In table III we show the effect of varying T for the case when the market reaction
is a temporary volatility increase to σ2 = 0.4. Observe that as T increases the band
widens. We conclude the analysis with the optimal policy when the reaction time T
is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1.
5. Proof of Theorem 3.4. Before we prove the theorem, we need the following
lemma:
Lemma 5.1. Let ν be an admissible control, and let σ be an intervention time for
ν. If the function φ satisfies φ ≤Mφ and the growth condition (3.12), then we have
the inequality
e−rσ (φ(Xνx (σ−))− φ(Xνx (σ)))
≤ e−rσK + E
[∫ σ+T
σ
e−rt(L2φ(Xνx (t)) + f(Xνx (t)) dt|Fσ
]
,
with equality if φ =Mφ, and where L2 is the operator defined by
1
2
σ22(x)
d2
dx2
+ µ2(x)
d
dx
− r. (5.1)
17
Proof. Application of Ito’s formula (3.4) to e−rtφ(Xνx (t)) gives
e−r(σ+T )φ(Xνx (σ + T )) = e
−rσφ(Xνx (σ)) +
∫ σ+T
σ
e−rtL2φ(Xνx (t)) dt
+
∫ σ+T
σ
e−rtσ2(Xνx (t))φ
′(Xνx (t)) dWt,
because between times σ and σ+T the controlled process follows the second diffusion.
Taking conditional expectations we obtain
E
[
e−r(σ+T )φ(Xνx (σ + T )) | Fσ
]
= e−rσφ(Xνx (σ)) (5.2)
+E
[∫ σ+T
σ
e−rtL2φ(Xνx (t)) dt+
∫ σ+T
σ
e−rtσ2(Xνx (t))φ
′(Xνx (t)) dWt | Fσ
]
= e−rσφ(Xνx (σ)) + E
[∫ σ+T
σ
e−rtL2φ(Xνx (t)) dt | Fσ
]
where the stochastic integral vanishes by condition (3.12) and that fact that the Ito
integral is a martingale.
Now, the inequality φ ≤Mφ says that for any positive z and y,
φ(z)− E
[
e−rTφ(X˜νy (T ))
]
≤ K + K˜(y)
= K + E
∫ T
0
e−rtf(X˜νy (t)) dt,
Therefore, using z = Xνx (σ−), y = Xνx (σ), this equation can be written as
φ(Xνx (σ−))− E
[
e−rTφ(Xνx (σ + T )) | Fσ
]
≤ K + E
[∫ σ+T
σ
e−r(t−σ)f(Xνx (t)) dt | Fσ
]
Multiplying by e−rσ we obtain
e−rσφ(Xνx (σ−))− E
[
e−r(σ+T )φ(Xνx (σ + T ))|Fσ
]
≤ e−rσK + E
[∫ σ+T
σ
e−rtf(Xνx (t))dt|Fσ
]
,
therefore using (5.2) we have
e−rσφ(Xνx (σ−))− e−rσφ(Xνx (σ)) ≤ E
[∫ σ+T
σ
e−rtL2φ(Xνx (t)) dt | Fσ
]
+ e−rσK + E
[∫ σ+T
σ
e−rtf(Xνx (t)) dt | Fσ
]
,
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which is the desired result.
We now prove theorem 3.4.
Proof. Consider any admissible control v = {(τn,∆Xn)}n∈N .
Define the stopping time τ∗(t) = max{τi : τi ≤ t}; note τ∗(t) → ∞ as t → ∞
almost surely since τi →∞ a.s.
We need to estimate the quantity
e−rτ
∗(t)φ(Xνx (τ
∗(t)))− φ(x) = A+B (5.3)
where A and B are the finite sums given by
A = 1{τ1≤t}(e
−rτ1φ(Xνx (τ1−))− φ(x)) +
∞∑
i=2
1{τi≤t}
(
e−rτiφ(Xνx (τi−))− e−rτi−1φ(Xνx (τi−1))
)
and
B =
∞∑
i=1
1{τi≤t}e
−rτi (φ(Xνx (τi)− φ(Xνx (τi−))) .
For the terms in the summation in A, in the event {τi ≤ t}, when i = 2, 3, . . . , n,
an application of Ito’s formula gives
e−rτiφ(Xνx (τi−))− e−rτi−1φ(Xνx (τi−1)) =
∫ τi−1+T
τi−1
e−rsL2φ(Xνx (s)) ds
+
∫ τi
τi−1+T
e−rsLφ(Xνx (s)) ds
+
∫ τi−1+T
τi−1
e−rsφ′(Xνx (s))σ2(X
ν
x (s)) dWs
+
∫ τi
τi−1+T
e−rsφ′(Xνx (s))σ1(X
ν
x (s)) dWs.
Here we are dropping the index i from Ti and σi2 because they are iid and independent
of Wt, and therefore the computations here are the same as if they were fixed.
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Using QVI inequality (3.8), Lφ+ f ≥ 0, this expression becomes
e−rτiφ(Xνx (τi−))− e−rτi−1φ(Xνx (τi−1)) ≥
∫ τi−1+T
τi−1
e−rsL2φ(Xνx (s)) ds
+
∫ τi
τi−1+T
e−rs(−f(Xνx (s)) ds
+
∫ τi−1+T
τi−1
e−rsφ′(Xνx (s))σ2(X
ν
x (s)) dWs
+
∫ τi
τi−1+T
e−rsφ′(Xνx (s))σ1(X
ν
x (s)) dWs,
with equality when Lφ+ f = 0.
For the term in A preceding the summation, we have, similarly,
e−rτ1φ(Xνx (τ1−))− φ(x)
=
∫ τ1
0
e−rsLφ(Xνx (s)) ds+
∫ τ1
0
e−rsφ′(Xνx (s))σ1(X
ν
x (s)) dWs,
≥
∫ τ1
0
e−rs(−f(Xνx (s))) ds+
∫ τ1
0
e−rsφ′(Xνx (s))σ1(X
ν
x (s)) dWs.
For the term in the second summation B of equation (5.3), we use lemma 5.1 so
that in the event {τi ≤ t} we have
e−rτi (φ(Xνx (τi)− φ(Xνx (τi−)))
≥ −e−rτiK − E
[∫ τi+T
τi
e−rs (L2φ(Xνx (s)) + f(Xνx (s)) ds|Fτi
]
,
with equality when φ =Mφ.
Therefore, reversing the sign and writing the i = 1 and i > 1 terms separately,
equation (5.3) becomes
φ(x)− e−rτ∗(t)φ(Xνx (τ∗(t))) ≤ I1 + I2 (5.4)
where I1 and I2 correspond the terms i = 1 and i = 2, . . . , n; namely,
I1 =1{τ1≤t}
(
e−rτ1K + E
[∫ τ1+T
τ1
e−rs(L2φ(Xνx (s)) + f(Xνx (s))) ds|Fτ1
]
+
∫ τ1
0
e−rsf((Xνx (s))) ds−
∫ τ1
0
e−rsφ′(Xνx (s))σ1(X
ν
x (s)) dWs
)
,
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I2 =
∞∑
i=2
1{τi≤t}
{[
e−rτiK + E
[∫ τi+T
τi
e−rs(L2φ(Xνx (s)) + f(Xνx (s))) ds|Fτi
]]
−
∫ τi−1+T
τi−1
e−rsL2φ(Xνx (s)) ds+
∫ τi
τi−1+T
e−rsf(Xνx (s)) ds
−
∫ τi−1+T
τi−1
e−rsφ′(Xνx (s))σ2(X
ν
x (s)) dWs −
∫ τi
τi−1+T
e−rsφ′(Xνx (s))σ1(X
ν
x (s)) dWs
}
.
We now take expectations on both sides of equation (5.4)
φ(x)− E
[
e−rτ
∗(t)φ(Xνx (τ
∗(t)))
]
≤ E[I1] + E[I2], (5.5)
and realize that the expectations of the stochastic integrals vanish because of condition
(3.12). If we collect all terms of the right hand side where the integrand is f(Xνx (t)),
we have
E
[
1{τ1≤t}
(
E
[∫ τ1+T
τ1
e−rsf(Xνx (s)) ds|Fτ1
]
+
∫ τ1
0
e−rsf((Xνx (s))) ds
)]
+E
[ ∞∑
i=2
1{τi≤t}
(
E
[∫ τi+T
τi
e−rs(f(Xνx (s))) ds|Fτi
]
+
∫ τi
τi−1+T
e−rsf(Xνx (s)) ds
)]
= E
[∫ τ∗(t)+T
0
e−rsf(Xνx (s)
]
,
where we have used
E
[
E[
∫ τi+T
τi
e−rs(f(Xνx (s))) ds] | Fτi
]
= E
[∫ τi+T
τi
e−rs(f(Xνx (s))) ds
]
.
Collecting all terms where the integrand is L2φ(Xνx (t)) in equation (5.5) we obtain
1{τ1≤t}E
(
E
[∫ τ1+T
τ1
e−rs(L2φ(Xνx (s))) ds|Fτ1
])
+
∞∑
i=2
1{τi≤t}
{
E
(
E
[∫ τi+T
τi
e−rs(L2φ(Xνx (s))) ds|Fτi
])
− E
[∫ τi−1+T
τi−1
e−rsL2φ(Xνx (s)) ds
]}
= E
[∫ τ∗(t)+T
τ∗(t)
e−rsL2φ(Xνx (s)) ds
]
.
Hence, equation 5.5 becomes
φ(x)− E
[
e−rτ
∗(t)φ(Xνx (τ
∗(t)))
]
(5.6)
≤ E[
∫ τ∗(t)
0
e−rsf(Xνx (s)) ds+
∫ τ∗(t)+T
τ∗(t)
e−rs(f(Xνx (s)) + L2φ(Xνx (s))) ds
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+
∞∑
i=1
1{τi≤t}e
−rτiK].
Now, let t go to infinity, notice that condition (3.13) tells us that the left-hand
side becomes
lim
t→∞φ(x)− E[e
−rτ∗(t)φ(Xνx (τ
∗(t)))] = φ(x),
while condition (3.14), the admissibility condition (2.5), and the dominated conver-
gence theorem imply that
E
[∫ τ∗(t)+T
τ∗(t)
e−rs(f(Xνx (s)) + L2φ(Xνx (s))) ds
]
→ 0 as t→∞.
Therefore,
φ(x) ≤ E
[ ∞∑
i=1
1{τi<∞}e
−rτiK +
∫ ∞
0
e−rsf(Xνx (s)) ds
]
.
Hence we have shown that
φ(x) ≤ Jv(x).
As this is true for any control v, we have
φ(x) ≤ V (x).
Now, the above inequalities become equalities for the QVI-control associated to φ.
6. Conclusions. We have addressed the problem of Central Bank intervention
in the exchange rate market incorporating the effect of a temporary market reaction,
of random duration, affecting the dynamics of the exchange rate process. The reaction
time T can have any bounded non-negative distribution provided it is stationary and
independent of the rate process. Using the Quasi-Variational Inequalities approach
to impulse control problems, we presented a verification theorem that allows us to
find the optimal policy and the Value Function for the problem. The main technical
innovation is the use of a new optimal intervention operatorM adapted to this setting.
We obtained an explicit solution of the problem for geometric brownian motion,
and showed how the optimal policies are influenced by the presence of the reaction
period after interventions. If volatility is assumed to jump up temporarily after inter-
ventions, the result is that the target band widens and the optimal costs increase. The
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band narrows if interventions are assumed to cause a decrease in volatility; a change
of drift in either direction causes the band to widen slightly. Thus, in most cases,
Banks should optimally intervene a little less often than they would if interventions
were completely invisible to the FX market.
It would be interesting to extend these results in various ways. Can the as-
sumption that no interventions are allowed during the reaction period be relaxed or
removed? What if the reaction time is not independent of the process? What if the
drift and volatility during the reaction time are random rather than fixed? These are
topics for further work.
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without reaction period
with reaction period
Fig. 6.1. Value function with one and two volatility regimes. The optimal strategy is more
expensive if there are two volatility regimes and a positive reaction period.
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Table I
Optimal Policy with and without a recovery period. K is the fixed intervention cost in this
illustration, a and b are the lower and upper intervention levels, and α is the optimal restarting
value.
Reaction Period K a b α
None (T = 0) 0.5 0.622 2.307 1.249
T = 1 0.5 0.581 2.365 1.212
None (T = 0) 0.63 0.581 2.365 1.230
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Table II
Optimal policy for different market reactions.
Type of reaction a b α
No reaction (σ1 = σ2 = 0.30, µ2 = µ1 = 0.10) 0.622 2.307 1.249
Volatility increases (σ2 = 0.40, µ2 = 0.10) 0.581 2.365 1.212
Volatility decreases (σ2 = 0.10, µ2 = 0.10) 0.678 2.230 1.235
Drift increases (σ2 = 0.30, µ2 = 0.15) 0.618 2.314 1.186
Drift decreases (σ2 = 0.30, µ2 = 0.05) 0.621 2.309 1.275
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Table III
Optimal Policy for different reaction time periods when volatility increases during the reaction
time.
Reaction Period a b α
None (T = 0) 0.622 2.307 1.249
T = 1 0.581 2.365 1.212
T = 2 0.516 2.461 1.072
T ∼ U [0, 1] 0.602 2.336 1.242
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